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We do not deny that there are good and logical reasons for giving
effect to exculpatory and indemnification clauses executed by par-
ents and guardians on behalf of infants and incompetents. Risk is
inherent in many of the activities that make the lives of children
richer. A world without risk would be an impoverished world in-
deed.... Ultimately, this case is a determination of who must bear
the burden of the risk of injury to... minors.1
Businesses, public entities and charities which furnish sports activities to
children are requiring participants and their parents to sign form waivers
prior to engaging in the activities.2 The forms usually purport to release
providers from any legal liability arising out of an activity. 3 Although
waivers in sports-related activities generally are legally enforceable,4 there
are exceptions based on grounds of both public policy considerations and
mutuality of assent.5 There also is a trend to disallow releases where the
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1. Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
2. Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Center, 670 F. Supp. 140, 144 (E.D. Pa.
1987); RONALD KAISER, LIABILITY & LAW IN RECREATION, PARKS & SPORTS 82 (1986). See
Phoebe Carter, Annotation, Validity, Construction and Effect of Provision Releasing School from
Liability for Injuries to Students Caused by Interscholastic and Other Extracurricular Activities, 85
A.L.R. 4th 342 (1991).
3. E.g., O'Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444, 444 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982). Providers seeking model language or forms should start by reading ROBERT C. BERRY &
GLENN M. WONG, 2 LAW AND THE BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES § 4.50 (1986). Forms
are reproduced both for participants who are adults and for those who are minors. Id. at 414-15.
4. See Brown, The Impact of Case Law on Liability Waivers, 3 JOURNAL OF SPORTS MAN-
AGEMENT 5, 5-6 (1989). For an analysis of the factors affecting the enforceability of waivers, see
Kevin F. Harrison, Taking the Tort Out With a Contract. Liability Release Contracts in Califor-
nia, 15 WESTERN STATE U. L. Rv. 781 (1988).
5. See SPORTS AND LAW: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES § 2.3 (Herb Appenzeller ed., 1985). See
also GEORGE SCHUBERT, RODNEY K. SMITH & JESSE C. TRENTADUE, SPORTS LAW § 7 (1986).
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participants are minors.6 However, neither providers nor parents appear to
appreciate fully the legal significance or insignificance of these waivers.7
This article examines the validity of waivers when signed by or for mi-
nors involved in sports-related activities. The remainder of the article is
divided into six parts:
1) Background;
2) The business rationale for waivers;
3) The legal rationale for waivers;
4) Services to children: parental waivers and indemnification;
5) Effect of a child's signature; and
6) Conclusion.
Only waivers of ordinary negligence are dealt with in this article because
exculpation rarely is allowed for gross negligence or intentional torts.' In
addition, discussion is limited to the impact of the principles of contract law
on the enforceability of these waivers because a tort defense is not necessary
if the plaintiff's tort rights have been validly waived by contract. Thus, the
effects of tort defenses, such as whether providers are the proximate or ac-
tual cause of injuries, whether participants assume the risk of injuries, or
whether a complete or partial defense exists under the theories of either
contributory or comparative negligence, are not analyzed.9
6. KAISER, supra note 2, at 84; Brown, supra note 4, at 10. But see Note, School Districts
Cannot Contract Out of Negligence Liability in Interscholastic Athletics, 102 HARV. L. REV. 729
(1989) (reporting the result but questioning the reasoning in Wagenblast v. Odessa School Dist.,
110 Wash. 2d 845, 758 P.2d 968 (1988)).
7. Brown, supra note 4, at 5. For a concise yet cogent analysis of the basic issues presented by
the use of waivers in sports-related activities, see Jeffrey S. Klein & Louis M. Brown, Finding
Fault When Someone Takes Risk, Gets Hurt, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1991, at E17, col. 1.
8. See Doyle v. Dowdoin College, 403 A.2d 1206, 1207-08 (Maine Sup. Ct. 1979); Note,
supra note 6, at 732-33.
9. Waiver of minors' rights to sue for negligence involves a variety of issues and policies
which cross over the boundary separating contracts from torts. See William L. Prosser, The Fall
of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 800 (1966). One prime
area is recent developments in the assumption of risk doctrine, especially as it relates to compara-
tive negligence. James Glassford, Assumption of Risk on Trial, 11 CAL. LAWYER 55 (1991).
However, an analysis of tort law implications and developments would require so much addi-
tional material that it is best to deal with it in a separate article. Furthermore, a tort defense is not
even necessary if the plaintiff's rights have been validly waived by contract. Thus, neither as-
sumption of the risk nor other tort defenses are dealt with in this article. Counsel nevertheless
should carefully consider the effect of a written waiver that also purports to act as an express
assumption of the risk. For a discussion of these defenses, see 4 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING
JAMES & OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS 239-260 (2d ed. 1986).
Several cases and articles have discussed comparative negligence and assumption of the risk.
See Knight v. Jewitt, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (1992); Knight v. Covin, 3 Cal. 4th 339, 11
Cal. Rptr. 2d 30 (1992); Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption ofRisk and Consent in the Law of Torts:




Two types of waivers commonly are used by sports providers."0 A gen-
eral waiver typically is used by providers offering services to adults. 11 How-
ever, for services targeted at minors, more specific language is common
12
which often includes an indemnity clause. 3 As to activities targeted at
adults, language of indemnity is rare and the document normally functions
solely as a waiver. A typical form for an adult activity, entitled "Voluntary
Release", reads in pertinent part as follows:
In consideration of... I... for myself, my personal representa-
tives, heirs, next of kin, spouse and assignees, DO HEREBY:
1. RELEASE, DISCHARGE AND COVENANT NOT TO
SUE ... each of them, their officers, agents and employees (...
'releasees') from any and all claims and liability or ordinary negli-
gence ...
2. UNDERSTAND that my entry . . . contains DANGER
AND RISK OF INJURY OR DEATH... nevertheless, I VOL-
UNTARILY ELECT TO ACCEPT ALL RISKS connected with
my entry ....
3. ACKNOWLEDGE that ... I ASSUME ALL RISK for
myself and assume all lability to others..., and I hereby RELEASE
4. AGREE that this agreement shall apply to any incident, in-
jury, accident or death ... I HAVE READ THIS DOCUMENT. I
UNDERSTAND IT IS A RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS.
I UNDERSTAND I ASSUME ALL RISK INHERENT IN
RACING.
I VOLUNTARILY SIGN MY NAME EVIDENCING MY
ACCEPTANCE OF THE ABOVE PROVISIONS. 14
the Risk After Comparative Negligence: Integrating Contract Theory into Tort Doctrine, 52 OHIO
ST. L.J. 717 (1991).
10. See BERRY & WONG, supra note 3, at 414-15. See also the language excerpted from
various cases discussed in Harrison, supra note 4, at 785, 790-91, and 793-94.
11. A terse example can be found in Rogers v. Donnelson-Hermitage Chamber of Commerce,
807 S.W.2d 242, 243-44 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (the waiver was in a handwritten note consisting of
only two sentences, the latter being "Under no circumstances will anyone or anything be liable in
case of an accident.").
12. Simmons v. Parkette Nat'1 Gymnastic Training Center, 670 F. Supp. 140, 141 (E.D. Pa.
1987).
13. A good example can be found in Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1989).
14. Nat'l and Int'l Bhd. of Street Car Racers, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 215 Cal. App. 3d 934, 936,
264 Cal. Rptr. 44, 45 (1989) (based on the waiver language, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court and granted summary judgement to the provider).
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In contrast, the following is more typical of a form targeted at minors.
It is a document, entitled simply "Permission Slip", required by a private
elementary school to be signed by both parents before a first grader is al-
lowed to attend a field trip. Unlike the general waiver reproduced above,
this form contains an indemnification clause but the participant's (child's)
signature is not required.15 The waiver states:
[T]he Undersigned... assume all risk associated with participation
in the above Program, . . . agree to indemnify, defend, and hold
harmless... and fully and forever release and discharge such parties
from any and all claims, demands, actions, causes of actions, suits,
controversies, obligations and liabilities of any kind and nature
whatsoever.., relating to personal injury or property damage sus-
tained directly or indirectly from the aforedescribed Program...
This, or similar exculpatory16 language, is becoming standard through-
out the country for childrens' extra-curricular activities. 7 In the context of
schools, permission slips have long been required to be signed by parents (or
guardians) before a child was allowed to participate in extra-curricular
activities.
In recent years, however, the "permission" provisions have been ex-
panded to include waiver provisions.1
As the above example illustrates, these provisions not only may purport
to waive all legal rights against the service provider, but also may profess
the service user's obligation to indemnify and defend the provider if a claim
arises. Whether this is consistent with or contrary to public policy is far
from clear.19
15. Although the language is more elegant, it is similar to that involved in Childress v.
Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 9-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). In sports activities provided to the
general public, as opposed to those specifically designed for minors, typically no indemnification is
involved and the signature of the participant (minor) is required along with that of only one
parent. See Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Center, 670 F. Supp. 140, 141 (E.D.
Pa. 1987). Interestingly, the same is true for traditional violent contact sports, such as high school
tackle football, involving only minors. See BERRY & WONG, supra note 3, at 414.
16. With few exceptions, the terms waiver, exculpatory clause, and release are used both by
the courts and by businesses interchangeably.
17. See Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); O'Connell v.
Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444, 444-45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
18. Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Center, 670 F. Supp. 140, 144 (E.D. Pa.
1987).
19. Compare Brown, supra note 4, at 10 (waiver on behalf of a child is per se invalid) and
KAISER, supra note 2, at 84 (the validity of such waivers is "tenuous") with BERRY & WONG,
supra note 3, at 392 (waivers for school sports activities are valid). See Note, supra note 6 (report-
ing a 1988 Washington Supreme Court ruling invalidating waivers for interscholastic athletics but
questioning the reasoning given in the ruling).
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Parents who balk at signing these forms, or who cross out one or more
of the clauses contained in the waiver, may find that the service provider is
unwilling to do business with the minor. This could result in a severe detri-
ment to the education of a child who, for example, is denied access to the
high school football team.2" On the other hand, unless service providers
spread risks back to participants, it is likely that many sporting events will
no longer be sponsored.21
An understanding of the reasons why businesses seek the protection of
waivers should help in understanding the competing interests which courts
balance when using public policy to decide law.
II. THE BuSINESS RATIONALE FOR WAIVERS
A. The Purpose of Waivers: To Shift Risk
Waivers are incorporated into contracts for several reasons. The pur-
pose may be any one of the following:
1) To minimize costs of the business protected by the waiver related to
claims of negligence;22
2) To explicitly state and make certain which costs (risks) will be borne
by which party;23
3) To reduce the cost of litigation by waiving the rights of one of the
parties to sue the other for negligent acts;24 and
20. Wagenblast v. Odessa School Dist., 110 Wash. 2d 845, 853-54, 758 P.2d 968 (1988).
21. Dunn v. Paducah Int'l Raceway, 599 F. Supp 612, 613 (W.D. Ky. 1984), cited with ap-
proval in Korsmo v. Waverly Ski Club, 435 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).
22. Damage awards (not to mention litigation costs) can have a devastating effect on either a
private "for profit" business or a public "non-profit" enterprise. Indeed, waivers may be most
important in ensuring the viability of many smaller organizations, whether for profit and not-for-
profit. Small organizations often lack either the resources to effectively self-insure or sufficient
dollar volume to easily absorb the additional cost of an insurance policy.
Private organizations can try to protect the individuals who organize sporting activities by
incorporating and using the bankruptcy court. Public organizations and municipalities may lack
this flexibility. A city can not as easily declare bankruptcy, change its name and begin business
again. Furthermore, public entities often have substantial assets which they may not wish to put
at risk in exchange for a relatively small user fee, such as a child's price for the use of a municipal
swimming pool. Where juries can award millions of dollars of damages to an injured participant,
will cities continue to furnish swimming, tennis, skiing and other facilities if they can not find or
afford adequate insurance? They may if they can rely on a waiver.
23. See LISA GARN & JOHN S. DIACONIs, Liability Release Forms: How Valid?, 92 BEST'S
REVIEW: PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE EDITION 52 (1991).
24. Even a valid waiver may be unsuccessful protection from increased costs if the provider
must go to trial to defend a lawsuit. Just hiring an attorney to answer a complaint and ask the
court to uphold a waiver in a summary judgement motion is expensive. A good example of the
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4) To reduce the cost of insurance by passing on the risk to the other
party.
Business entities offer their services in the hopes of receiving a return on
their investment.25 Having to bear the economic risk of loss resulting from
negligence can be very expensive to the service provider. When faced with
the prospects of an otherwise desirable market which is subject to uncertain
risks of negligence litigation, businesses often have responded by incorpo-
rating exculpatory language into their contracts.26
The language usually purports to waive some or all liability for negli-
gent action or inaction on the part of the service provider. The purpose of
the waiver is to reduce the provider's costs by identifying those risks that
will be borne by the buyer. However, if the waiver is invalidated by the
courts, the risk will revert to the service provider.
B. Alternatives to Waivers
Providers have powerful incentives to insulate themselves from the risks
associated with harm suffered by participants or third parties as the result
of a sporting event. When a plaintiff prevails in litigation, uninsured or
underinsured verdicts can be very expensive. Even when a plaintiff is un-
successful, the cost of legal defense just to prove that a waiver is valid can
be staggering.27 Potential lawsuits mean higher risk and ultimately higher
costs which providers will try to pass on to the consumer. If successfully
passed on, the consumer winds up paying more. If not passed on, profits
may be reduced or eliminated.28 In the hopes of reducing their share of the
costs incurred even where a waiver is ultimately held to be valid is Korsmo v. Waverly Ski Club,
435 N.W.2d 746 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).
In that case, summary judgment was granted by the trial court on the grounds that plaintiff
had signed a release. Plaintiff appealed, contending that there were genuine issues of fact concern-
ing whether he had knowingly and voluntarily assumed the risk of the release. Although the
summary judgment was affirmed on appeal, the cost of briefing each court and of taking deposi-
tions prior to each decision most likely was high. It could have been more expensive if the trial
court had ordered a trial rather than granting summary judgment.
On the other hand, even an invalid waiver can minimize costs, either by discouraging injured
parties from suing or by enhancing defenses such as assumption of the risk. KAISER, supra note 2,
at 84.
25. For the relationship between the risk of a venture and the corresponding return de-
manded by investors, see RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPO-
RATE FINANCE 117-75 (2d ed. 1984).
26. For an extensive discussion of several cases in the area, see Brown, supra note 4, at 781-
796 (1988).
27. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 25, at 117-75. Even an insured defendant may pay
the cost of covered claims through higher future premiums.
28. Even if the provider is able to increase its price to the consumer, it may determine that all
of the risk can not be offset because the risk can not be quantified or fully covered by insurance.
[V/ol. 2:151
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costs, providers may incorporate waivers into their contracts to minimize
the risk of loss caused by either defending or paying claims filed by their
customers.
There are many ways for providers to deal with the risks without relying
on waivers. However, these alternatives may be more expensive. One way
is to invest in safety, but the cost of making an activity as injury-free as
possible may be prohibitive. Furthermore, many events, such as contact
sports, do not lend themselves to this approach.
Another way is to exit the market. A provider perceiving a significant
increase in risk may respond with a strategic reduction in effort in the line
of projects affected. Providers may even decide to withdraw from the mar-
ket sector altogether rather than face unlimited or unacceptable uncertainty
over possible losses from lawsuits based on purportedly negligent behavior.
A withdrawal may be forced on a venture which seeks bankruptcy protec-
tion as a result of successful claims. On the other hand, withdrawal may be
unsatisfactory because its full cost includes the profits lost by not serving an
otherwise lucrative market.
These two alternatives to waivers may not be satisfactory to providers.
If available, investing in safety may not be affordable, and otherwise profita-
ble opportunities may be lost when a provider withdraws from a market.
To capture those opportunities without undue cost, providers may seek to
protect themselves in yet another way, with insurance.
A third way for providers to shift risks to others is to insure the risk.
This allows the potential for liability to be paid explicitly in the form of
insurance premiums. However, insurance must be available to be an effec-
tive means to protect providers. Even if available, insurance also must be
affordable.
Where adequate insurance is not affordable, providers may seek to lower
the premiums by reducing the liability limits, restricting the type of activi-
ties covered, or narrowing the types of costs that will be reimbursed. To the
extent such reductions are made, the cost to the provider of bearing the risk
is not explicit. The cost nevertheless remains in the possibility that the pro-
vider may have to pay on a claim that otherwise would have been covered
Accordingly, continuing to provide services to minors in a high risk venture may not be economi-
cally justified unless valid waivers can be entered into. The impact of the economics of risk shar-
ing on the contracting process is powerfully analyzed in Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 JOURNAL oF LAW AND ECONOMIcS 1 (1960). (The development of the theory first postu-
lated in this article may have earned Professor Coase the Nobel Prize in Economics. See Donald
Wootat, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 16, 1991, at 1.) For a more current view, see Elizabeth Hoffman &
Matthew Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 JouRNAL OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 73 (1982).
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by a more extensive policy.29 Rather than making such reductions, provid-
ers instead may include waivers into their contracts in the hopes of reducing
insurance premiums.
III. THE LEGAL RATIONALE FOR WAIVERS
A. Legislative Versus Judicial Action
Although legislatures can address the issue of whether waivers in sports-
related activities should be upheld, they generally have failed to do so.30
This is not because legislators lack the power or ability to deal with the
issue by statute. Legislatures have enacted statutes explicitly permitting
waivers in other areas. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code allows
parties to waive consequential damages unless the "limitation or exclusion
is unconscionable."3 Similarly, the enactment of workers' compensation
laws legislatively eliminates the use of waivers in the employer-employee
relationship. 32 These laws provide strict limits to injured employees' dam-
age awards in exchange for employers giving up the opportunity to protect
29. An alternative for providers that cannot pass on the risk through a waiver and cannot
afford insurance is "self-insurance". When done by a wealthy enterprise, it merely represents
another business risk. When done by an undercapitalized business, however, self-insurance may
be more than just another risk: it may lead to bankruptcy if a successful claim is filed.
In effect, incorporation of a risky venture is a form self-insurance. If the corporate form is
respected by the courts and the owner is not personally negligent, a plaintiff may be left with a
judgement against a judgement-proof corporation. Because the corporate form is likely to be
respected by the court where there is either minimal insurance or some reasonable net worth in
the venture, incorporation may effectively shift the risk of loss to the consumer even in the absence
of a waiver. For the value of incorporating non-profit organizations, see MALVERN J. GROSS, JR.,
WILLIAM WARSHAUER, JR. & ROBERT LARKIN, FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING GUIDE FOR
NoT-FoR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 1-25 (4th ed. 1991).
30. KAISER, supra note 2, at 84. There have been state statutes prohibiting releases on sports
admission tickets. Id. (noting that New York enacted such a statute after the decision upholding
an adult's waiver in Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 294, 177 N.E.2d 925 (1961)).
However, none of the sources cited in this article refers to any state statute specifying the treat-
ment of sports-related waivers on behalf of minors, nor could any such statute be found.
There are many references to limitations on waivers in general, however, such as those found
in the Field Codes adopted by many states in the late 1800s, eg., Note, supra note 6, at 732
(explaining CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 1985)), or in judicial public policy analyses. Id. (citing
Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941)). On the other hand, some state statutes
specifically allow waivers, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 102-06 (1980), and have rejected judicial public
policy analyses, Williams v. Cox Enterprises, 159 Ga. App. 333, 283 S.E.2d 367 (Ga. Ct. App.
1981), cited with approval in Wade v. Watson, 527 F. Supp. 1049, 1051-52 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
31. See U.C.C. §§ 2-316 and 2-719 (1977).
32. Whether the model of the workers' compensation law is an appropriate legislative solu-
tion to the high cost of negligence litigation is beyond the scope of this article. However, it is one
possibility that may be better than the all or nothing approach forced on courts when faced with
deciding the validity of a waiver.
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themselves with waivers, along with giving up virtually all common law
defenses.33
As opposed to legislative action, the courts have been much more active
in addressing the validity of waivers. An example is in "contracts of adhe-
sion," where waivers will not be upheld because one party has virtually no
bargaining power.34 Except in contracts of adhesion, however, courts gen-
erally will not invalidate a waiver unless it either violates public policy or
the waiving party did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to waive his or
her rights.
B. Waiver Unenforceable Unless Knowing and Voluntary
Many courts have focused on a variety of drafting flaws when determin-
ing that a participant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive rights.36 As
one court wisely observed:
Drafters of releases always face the problem of steering between the
Scylla of simplicity and the Charybdis of completeness. Apparently,
no release is immune from attack .... [but to] be effective, a release
need not achieve perfection; only on Draftsman's Olympus is it feasi-
ble.... It suffices that a release be clear, unambiguous, and explicit,
and that it express an agreement not to hold the released party liable
37for negligence....
Dealing with the issue by private contract rather than by public fiat may
not be optimal in the eyes of service providers. Including an exculpation
clause may not relieve a provider of all litigation costs even if the waiver
ultimately proves enforceable: there still may be an issue of fact as to
whether the waiver was entered into knowingly or voluntarily. If so, sum-
mary judgement can be denied and thus the service provider may have to
bear the costs of a trial and appeals.3 8
33. The employer is forced to give up the defense of contributory negligence (or comparative
negligence) and that of assumption of the risk; waivers are specifically prohibited. P. DELANEY &
I. GLEIM, BUSINESS LAW 431-34 (1991).
34. Madison v. Super. Ct., 203 Cal. App. 3d 589, 598, 250 Cal. Rptr. 299, 304-05 (1988).
35. Nat'l and Int'l Bhd. of Street Racers v. Super. Ct., 215 Cal. App. 3d 934, 937-38, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 44, 46-47 (1989).
36. Terry Ann Halbert, Setting Aside Releases for Personal Injury, 53 PENN. BAR ASS'N Q.
209, 209-14 (1982).
37. Nat'l and Int'l Bhd. of Street Racers v. Super. Ct., 215 Cal. App. 3d 934, 937-38, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 44, 46-47 (1989) (citations omitted).
38. Compare Rogers v. Donnelson-Hermitage Chamber of Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (decision after full trial was appealed) with Korsmo v. Waverly Ski Club,
435 N.W.2d 746 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (summary judgement was appealed).
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Furthermore, courts have invalidated waivers by finding that the provi-
sion was not adequately disclosed to the service user. Reasons given by the
courts range from the type size being inadequate,39 the word "release" be-
ing used only in the title of the document," the word "equipment" not
being used although the word "activity" was,41 and a variety of other
points.42 In contrast to these cases decided on technical flaws, some courts
do not even require that the word "negligence" be used when liability is
being waived.43
When deciding whether a waiver is valid, most courts look to the "four
comers of the instrument" to determine both the intent of the parties and
whether the contract notifies the releasor of the effect of entering into the
agreement.' In making this determination, courts deem that a party sign-
ing a contract has read the contract.45 This approach normally results in a
contract waiver being upheld unless the waiver violates public policy.4 6
C. The Judicial Public Policy Test
Where parties have entered into an otherwise valid waiver, the plaintiff
may try to invalidate the waiver on the basis that the waiver violates public
policy. Courts generally recognize that no public policy prevents parties
from agreeing that the consumer has the responsibility of looking out for his
or her own interests.47
39. Conservatorship of Link, 158 Cal. App. 3d 138, 205 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1984) (printing
should not be smaller than 8 to 10 points). Note that this holding has been distinguished in
subsequent cases. E.g., Bennett v. U.S. Cycling Federation, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 239 Cal. Rptr.
55 (1987).
40. Ferrell v. Southern Nevada Off-Road Enthusiasts, Ltd., 147 Cal. App. 3d 309, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 90 (1983).
41. Calarco v. YMCA of Greater Metropolitan Chicago, 149 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 501 N.E. 2d
268 (1986).
42. See Harrison, supra note 4, at 788.
43. Morrow v. Auto Championship Racing Ass'n. Inc., 8 IM. App. 3d 682, 291 N.E.2d 30
(Ill. Ct. App. 1972).
44. Nat'l and Int'l Bhd. of Street Racers v. Super. Ct., 215 Cal. App. 3d 934, 938, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 44 (1989).
45. Although notice of an exculpatory clause is a prerequisite to its validity, a party's failure
to read does not constitute a lack of notice to that party. Dixon v. Manier, 545 S.W.2d 948, 949
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).
46. KAISER, supra note 2, at 84.
47. See Wagenblast v. Odessa School Dist., 110 Wash. 2d 845, 851, 758 P.2d 968 (1988); W.
PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSOR AND KEE-
TON ON TORTS 482 (1984).
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In the seminal case in the area, Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal, 48
the court tested against six standards to determine whether an exculpatory
clause violated public policy.4 9 This six part test has been followed by
many states.50
Under the test, waivers are enforceable unless:
1) The business involved is of a type generally thought suitable for pub-
lic regulation;
2) The party seeking relief from negligence liability performs services of
great importance to the public, a service often a matter of practical neces-
sity for some members of the public;
3) The party seeking relief offers to serve any member of the public who
seeks it, or at least anyone whose ability meets certain established
standards;
4) The essential nature of the service gives the party seeking relief a
decisive advantage in bargaining power;
5) This results in the public being confronted with taking or leaving a
standardized contract, with no provision for paying reasonable additional
fees to obtain protection against negligence; and
6) As a result of the contract, members of the public utilizing the serv-
ices are under the control of, and thus subject to the risk of carelessness by,
the party seeking to avoid responsibility for his own negligence. 1
In applying this public policy analysis to sports-related waivers, almost
all courts have focused on the second standard to determine whether the
sport is the type of activity that is of public necessity.52 One court dealt
48. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441 (1963). For a discussion of Tunk's importance in establish-
ing the approach taken by most courts see Note, supra note 6, at 732.
49. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 98-101, 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (1963).
50. Morgan v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 466 So. 2d 107, 117 (Ala. 1985); Municipality of
Anchorage, Alaska v. Locker, 723 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Alaska 1986); LaFrenz v. Lake County Fair
Board, 172 Ind. App. 389, 395, 360 N.E.2d 605, 608-09 (1977); Schrier v. Beltway Alarm Co., 73
Md. App. 281, 296-98, 522 A.2d 1316 (1987); Lynch v. Santa Fe National Bank, 97 N.M. 554,
558-59, 627 P.2d 1247 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981); Lee v. Consolidated Edison Co., 95 Misc. 2d 1290,
1304, 407 N.Y.S.2d 777, 787 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1978), reversed on other grounds, 413 N.Y.S.2d 826
(N.Y. App. Term. 1978); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tenn. 1977); Wagenblast v.
Odessa School Dist., 110 Wash. 2d 845, 851-52, 758 P.2d 968 (1988).
51. Sports participants often are at the control of a provider seeking to avoid responsibility
for negligence. However, injuries can be caused by parties other than the provider, such as unruly
fans, participants' unsportsmanlike behavior, or negligent third parties. See Wagenblast v. Odessa
School Dist., 110 Wash. 2d 845, 857, 758 P.2d 968 (1988).
52. The Washington Supreme Court has stated in the context of public policy:
In reviewing these decisions, it is apparent that the court has not always been particularly
clear on what rationale it used to decide what type of release was and was not violative of
'public policy'. Undoubtedly, it has been much easier for courts to simply declare releases
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with the issue by summarily concluding that "[a]lthough a popular sport,
... mountaineering, like scuba diving, does not involve public interest....
Therefore, the exculpatory clause is... enforceable."53 Similarly, in a case
involving a waiver by a motorcyclist at a recreational park, another court
concluded that only a strained construction would label a sports-related
activity as involving a public interest. 4
In upholding a waiver used in a bicycle competition,55 a court cogently
summarized this approach:
The service provided here was the organization and running of
competitive bicycle races.... This is very similar to the organization
and sponsorship of numerous 10-kilometer and marathon running
events that have blossomed since the mid to late 1970's.... Without
such organization and sponsorship, those that desire to enter bicycle
racing would undoubtedly have no chance to do so under organized
settings. Therefore, there is no doubt but that respondents offer a
public service. However, does it measure up to the public impor-
tance necessary to void the release?... Measured against the public
interest in hospitals ... escrow transactions, banking ... and com-
mon carriers, this transaction is not one of great public
importance.5 6
Relying on this approach, courts have upheld waivers of rights to sue
for negligence in cases involving mountain climbing,57 skydiving, 58 motor-
cycle "dirt biking", 59 running,' scuba diving,61 stock car racing," swim-
635ming,6 ski jumping,64 and water skiing.65
violative of public policy in a given situation than to state a principled basis for so holding.
... Obviously, the more of the foregoing six characteristics that appear in a given exculpa-
tory agreement, the more likely the agreement is to be declared invalid on public policy
grounds.
Id. at 851.
53. Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering, Inc., 30 Wash. App. 571, 572-73, 636 P.2d 492, 493
(1981).
54. Coates v. Newhall Land & Farming, Inc., 191 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8, 236 Cal. Rptr. 181, 188
(1987).
55. Okura v. U.S. Cycling Federation, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1462, 231 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1986).
56. Id. at 1466-67.
57. Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering, Inc., 30 Wash. App. 571, 636 P.2d 492 (1981).
58. Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Center, 168 Cal. App. 3d 333, 214 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1985).
59. Kurashige v. Indian Dunes, Inc., 200 Cal. App. 3d 606, 246 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1988).
60. Williams v. Cox Enterprises, 159 Ga. App. 333, 283 S.E.2d 367 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981), cited
with approval in Wade v. Watson, 527 F. Supp. 1049, 1051-52 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
61. Hewitt v. Miller, 11 Wash. App. 72, 521 P.2d 244 (1974).
62. Grbac v. Reading Fair Co., 521 F. Supp. 351 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 688 F.2d 215 (3d Cir.
1981).
63. Owen v. Vic Tanney Enterprises, 48 Ill. App. 2d 344, 199 N.E.2d 780 (II. S. Ct. 1964).
64. Garretson v. U.S.A., 456 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1972).
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The courts of some states have refrained from adopting this public pol-
icy approach, albeit usually arriving at the same result as if they had fol-
lowed Tunkl."1 For example, in upholding a waiver signed by a runner in
the 1977 Peachtree Road Race against a claim that the agreement violated
public policy under Georgia law, the court stated that a contract will be
contrary to public policy only if the General Assembly has declared it to be
invalid or enacted a statute forbidding it expressly or impliedly, the consid-
eration is contrary to good morals, or the contract is entered into for the
purpose of effecting an illegal or immoral agreement.67
D. Public Policy Favors Waivers in Sports-Related Activities
One can easily argue that public policy favors waivers, as some courts
have done.68 Waivers and exculpatory clauses promote public policy be-
cause without such releases it is doubtful that some hazardous activities
would occur.69 As one court poignantly observed, "many popular... rec-
reational activities [would be] destined for extinction" unless waivers are
enforceable. ° Public policy also is served by allowing people the freedom
to enter into contracts.71 In addition, it favors voluntary risk shifting
arrangements.72
Following this line of reasoning, providers of sport services generally
have been allowed to exculpate themselves from liability for their negli-
gence, as against adults who sign the contract.7
That is not to say that all waivers are held to be valid. Some contracts
have been held to violate public policy74 because courts are reluctant to
allow those charged with a public duty to rid themselves of their duty of
65. Korsmo v. Waverly Ski Club, 435 N.W.2d 746 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (summary judge-
ment was granted on the grounds that plaintiff's suit was barred by a release he had signed).
66. See, eg., Williams v. Cox Enterprises, 159 Ga. App. 333, 335, 283 S.E.2d 367, 368-69
(Ga. Ct. App. 1981), cited with approval in Wade v. Watson, 527 F. Supp. 1049, 1051-52 (N.D.
Ga. 1981); Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496, 465 P.2d 107 (1970); Hunter v.
American Rentals, Inc., 189 Kan. 615, 371 P.2d 131 (1962); Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 266
(1941).
67. Williams v. Cox Enterprises, 159 Ga. App. 333, 283 S.E.2d 367 (Ga. App. 1981), cited
with approval in Wade v. Watson, 527 F. Supp. 1049, 1051-52 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
68. Dunn v. Paducah Int'l Raceway, 599 F. Supp 612, 613 (W.D. Ky. 1984), cited with ap-
proval in Korsmo v. Waverly Ski Club, 435 N.W.2d 746, 756 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).
69. Id.
70. Nat'l and Int'l Bhd. of Street Car Racers, Inc. v Super. Ct., 215 Cal. App. 3d 934, 938
(1989).
71. Schlessman v. Henson, 83 Ill. 2d 82, 413 N.E.2d 1252 (1980).
72. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 101, 383 P.2d 441, 446 (1963).
73. Brown, supra note 4, at 5-14.
74. See Halbert, supra note 36, at 209-10.
1992]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
care by contract. 75 Thus, common carriers, innkeepers, professional bailees
and public utilities which try to use waivers to shift the risk of loss for their
negligent behavior have found that such provisions violate public policy.76
This is based on the conclusion that these types of services are so impor-
tant to the public that a certain level of performance therefore is required. 7
Businesses such as banks that provide safe deposit boxes and landlords try-
ing to exculpate liability for safety in common areas have had their waivers
invalidated by the courts on public policy grounds. 7 In certain transac-
tions where waivers violate public policy, some states have enacted statu-
tory limitations.79 Sport services, however, generally have been viewed in a
different light. They are not seen as so important as to rise to the level of a
necessary public service. Thus, sports providers typically have been al-
lowed to exculpate themselves as against adults who sign the contract.
IV. SERVICES TO CHILDREN: PARENTAL WAIVERS AND
INDEMNIFICATION
As discussed above, the law generally allows providers to require adults
participating in sporting events to waive their rights to sue for negligence.
Many providers of sports services to children, including schools, gyms, and
sports leagues, whether non-profit or for profit, similarly require waivers of
rights to sue for harm suffered by children participating in these events.80
Normally only parents are required to sign the waivers, but some forms also
require the child's signature."1 This may not be necessary in states such as
Texas which have enacted statutes specifically permitting parents to waive
their childrens' rights.8 2
75. Wagenblast v. Odessa School Dist., 110 Wash. 2d 845, 849, 758 P.2d 968 (1988).
76. Id. at 849-50.
77. Id. at 850.
78. Id. at 850-51.
79. KAISER, supra note 2, at 84 (New York statute prohibits waivers on tickets for sporting
events). For an interesting legislative balancing of the competing interests involved with waivers,
consider CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 1991) (health care providers cannot enforce
waivers, but in turn some types of medical malpractice claims are limited to damages of
$250,000).
80. See Kaiser, supra note 2.
81. In most running events, such as 10 kilometer road races, it is customary for both the
parent and the minor to sign. See BERRY & WONG, supra note 3, at 414.
82. TEX. FAM. LAW § 12.09 (1989) provides in pertinent part that:
"[T]he parent of a child has the following rights, privileges, duties, and powers:
(7) the power to represent the child in legal action and to make other decisions of substantial legal
significance concerning the child .... "
This section was held to bind an infant to a contract which a parent signed on the child's behalf in
Faollana v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd, 700 F.2d 1000
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Sports providers have included exculpation language in the hopes that it
will restrict the rights of both children and parents."3 Providers also may
hope that even if a release is not valid, a potential plaintiff may believe that
it is valid and therefore refrain from bringing a lawsuit.8 4 Some may even
include exculpatory language merely because it was seen in a competitor's
contract.85
Two issues are raised by a waiver which is signed by a parent on behalf
of a child. To what extent is the agreement enforceable, 6 and if it is en-
forceable, against whom does it apply? In the case of an indemnity provi-
sion, an additional issue is raised: is the signing parent jointly and severally
liable as an indemnitor?8 7
A. Waivers
1. The Wagenblast Public Policy Approach
Although public policy generally has been held to favor waivers in
sports-related activities, recent cases suggest a different result where minors
are involved."8 When the Washington Supreme Court considered the issue
on first impression in 1988, it held in Wagenblast v. Odessa School Dist. 89
(5th Cir. 1986). See also CAL. CODE OF CrV. PRoc. § 1295(d), which provides that a minor may
not disaffirm a contract for medical services if it is signed by a parent or guardian.
83. For a comprehensive discussion of sports liability in general, see GEORGE W. SHUBERT,
RODNEY K. SMITH & JESSE C. TRENTADUE, supra note 5, CYM H. WEINSTART & JOHN C.
LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORT (1976), and HERB APPENZELLER, PHYSICAL EDUCATION AND
THE LAW (1978).
84. KAISER, supra note 2, at 84. This brings up an interesting point of legal ethics. Does an
attorney's suggestion to place a knowingly invalid waiver into a contract, in the hopes that an
uninformed party may be tricked into believing that the waiver is valid, violate the lawyer's ethical
duties? No ruling could be found where an attorney had been disciplined for such an action.
85. Id.
86. Cf Brown, supra note 4, at 5. In a non-random sample interview of parents of children
involved in sports activities, many indicated their belief that the waiver forms they sign are not
enforceable.
87. If so, does this effectively eviscerate the child's potential recovery by forcing the parents
to pay the legal fees of both sides, in addition to providing the funds to pay the damages inflicted
by the negligent service provider? Probably not, as indemnity clauses are generally interpreted in
the same manner as exculpatory clauses. O'Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444,
446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). But see Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1989) (wife who signed ruled jointly liable with other defendants for damages awarded to
husband, who did not sign). See also infra text accompanying notes 118-122.
88. Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Simmons v. Parkette
Nat'l Gymnastic Training Center, 670 F. Supp. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1987); O'Connell v. Walt Disney
World Co., 413 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Wagenblast v. Odessa School Dist., 110
Wash. 2d 845, 758 P.2d 968 (1988).
89. Wagenblast v. Odessa School Dist., 110 Wash. 2d 845, 758 P.2d 968 (1988).
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that public schools could not enforce releases required as a condition to
student participation in certain school-related sports activities.
The court first reviewed the Tunkl six-pronged public policy test,90 and
then adopted it.91 Applying the test, the court determined that, in the case
of participation in a public school interscholastic activity, a waiver violates
all six prongs.92 "Given this emphasis on sports by the public and the
school system, it would be unrealistic to expect students to view athletics as
an activity separate and apart from the remainder of their schooling."93
Accordingly, the court found that exculpatory clauses used by school dis-
tricts for children's sports violates public policy and thus will not be given
effect, either against a minor or a parent who signs the form.94 It is unclear
how many states will adopt this reasoning9" and what other businesses96
will be held to the same standards.97
2. The Childress Disaffirmance Approach
Based on contract principles rather than public policy, other courts
have invalidated waivers as to a child participating in a sports activity,98 but
not necessarily as to a parent who signs the waiver.99 In Childress v.
90. See supra text and accompanying notes 48-72.
91. Wagenblast v. Odessa School Dist., 110 Wash. 2d 845, 851-52, 758 P.2d 968, 972-74
(1988).
92. Id. at 857.
93. Id. at 853-54.
94. Id. at 858. The court also stated that "If the release is against public policy, however, it is
also against public policy to say that the plaintiff has assumed that particular risk." Id. at 856.
However, the Court noted that the minor assumed the risk of injuries not caused by the school
district, such as recklessness of an opponent, which no amount of reasonable supervision or train-
ing can eliminate. Id. at 857.
95. The case is criticized in Note, supra note 6, at 729.
96. The Wagenblast court determined that there is an intimate relationship between inter-
scholastic sports and other aspects of public education. Thus, it noted that this serves to distin-
guish interscholastic activities from those involving adult education for hazardous activities such
as skydiving and mountain climbing. Wagenblast, 110 Wash. 2d at 854. Accordingly, this case
may be limited to public (and possibly private) schools.
97. The Wagenblast court pointed out that "Many students cannot afford private programs
or the private school where such releases might not be employed." Id. at 855. Does this mean
that private schools can continue to insist on waivers, because the student always has the ability to
enroll in public schools where the waiver is invalid?
98. Eg., Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Simmons v.
Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Center, 670 F. Supp. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1987); O'Connell v. Walt
Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
99. Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). For purposes of
contract law, a minor and a mentally retarded individual are treated similarly. Id at 6. They are
both electively incompetent to enter into contracts, if they wish to disaffirm. In this case, the
student did not sign the contract. Thus, the sole issue as to the student was whether his parent
could waive the child's rights by signing the permission slip.
CONTRACTUAL WAIVERS
Madison County,'I the mother of a mentally retarded twenty year old who
was enrolled in a special school run by the County and the Y.M.C.A. signed
a standard waiver, but neither the father nor the child signed. A parent's
signature on the release was a precondition to the child's participation in
training for the Special Olympics in the Y.M.C.A. swimming pool. 101 The
alleged negligence occurred when the teacher turned her back to the pool
after all of the children had left the pool. She did not notice when the
plaintiff later re-entered the pool and nearly drowned.102
The trial court held that, by signing the permission slip, the mother
waived all of the family's rights. 103 Thus, she could not sue for her own
emotional distress when her child almost died."° Nor could the father sue
for his suffering because the trial court ruled that the mother acted as the
father's agent when she signed the slip in her capacity as a parent giving
permission. °0 The trial court held that she also waived the child's rights to
sue for damages.10 6 Because all actions against the defendants were dis-
missed, the court did not discuss the effect of the indemnity clause con-
tained in the waiver.
The appellate court upheld the trial court's ruling as to the mother, but
reversed as to the father and the child.'07 The mother who had signed was
held to have validly waived her rights to sue on her own behalf for her own
damages. This was based on her actual or constructive notice of the waiver.
100. Id. at 5. The waiver read in pertinent part:
"I... individually and on behalf of the above-named entrant, acknowledge that the entrant will be
using facilities at his/her own risk. I, on my own behalf, hereby release, discharge and indentify
(sic) Special Olympics... from all liabilities for damage, injury or illness to the entrant or his/her
property...
Id at 5.
101. Id at 5-6.
102. Id. at 6.
103. Id. at 1.
104. Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
105. Id. This is interesting in and of itself because the father never raised the issue of whether
he had granted permission for the child to participate at all. Had he refused permission, he may
have had an additional cause of action, albeit perhaps with no easily proven damages, for wrong-
ful asportation of the child by the service provider. Consider the effect had the father been able to
show a bona fide religious belief against the activity, or if the father was in the process of divorcing
the mother.
This leads to questions beyond the scope of this paper. Whose signature should be required
when parents are divorced? Especially if they are remarried? Are grandparents' signatures neces-
sary? What if they are the primary care providers?
106. Id
107. Id. at 8.
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It also was based on the legal conclusion that her waiver of an emotional
distress claim did not violate public policy.108
As to the father, who had not signed the waiver, the court noted that
there was no indication that Mrs. Childress was authorized to release his
rights. Thus, the father could recover for his own personal injuries. "9
As to the child, the appellate court ruled that as a matter of law a parent
cannot waive a child's rights. 110 In support of its conclusion, the court first
determined that the ability of the mother to waive the student's rights is the
same for a minor as it is for an incompetent.111 The court then cited nu-
merous examples of the inability of a parent or guardian to waive a minor's
rights. As the court strongly concluded: "'Minors can waive nothing. In
the law they are helpless, so much so that their representatives can waive
nothing for them.' "112
In rejecting the waiver, the court was aware of the negative economic
effect of its decision on service providers, explaining that "there are good
and logical reasons for giving effect to exculpatory and indemnification
clauses executed by parents and guardians on behalf of infants and
incompetents."1 13
The court had another opportunity to deal with the issue in late 1990,
and again refused to enforce a very broadly worded waiver signed by a
mother.114 This time the event involved a charity equestrian event.115
108. Note that the release of the mother's claims for her own damages would not act as a
release of her derivative claims were she to sue on behalf of a deceased child in a wrongful death
action. Rogers v. Donnelson-Hermitage Chamber of Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242, 242-43 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1990).
109. Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
110. Id. at 15-16.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 7, citing Khoury v. Saik, 203 Miss. 155, 33 So. 2d 616, 618 (1948).
113. Id. (citations omitted).
114. Rogers v. Donnelson-Hermitage Chamber of Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1990). Here, the appellate court reversed the trial court's holding that a release signed by a
mother was valid against the child. The release consisted of the mother's handwritten note which
stated "[u]nder no circumstances will anyone or anything be liable in case of an accident." Id. at
244. Even though the mother clearly understood what she was signing, the court followed Chil-
dress, holding that a mother can only waive her own rights and not those of her child. Id. at 246-
47.
115. Id. at 243-44. Although the language was dictated by the minor-participant, she did not
sign the waiver. Instead it was contained in her mother's handwritten note. The note was the
result of a telephone call the night before it was written. The call came from the teenaged daugh-
ter who participated in the event, and the daughter "told her [mother] what to say." Id The
event was an annual horse race celebrating Andrew Jackson at his home, The Hermitage. The
daughter was killed as she maneuvered her horse to avoid vehicles which had crossed her path.
Id.
CONTRACTUAL WAIVERS
The conclusion that contract law principles render waivers unenforce-
able against minors has been reached in other jurisdictions. 116 For example,
the Superior Court of Connecticut has held that parents of a minor cannot
waive the minor's rights as a condition for attending a camp. 17
The Supreme Court of Maine has reached the same conclusion, stating
that if the agreement in question were a release, it would have been ineffec-
tive because a parent cannot release a child's rights.1 "
Thus, although there are few cases dealing with the waiver of rights for
minors in sports-related activities, the weight of the decisions is that the
waivers cannot be enforced against the minors. Courts which follow the
Wagenblast public policy approach would not allow the waiver to be en-
forced against any party. However, a court taking the Childress disaffirm-
ance approach may hold the agreement enforceable against a parent who
signs the form. Thus, a parent who signs a waiver may lose the right to sue
a provider for harm suffered by the PARENT, but a parent's agreement to
waive the CHILD'S rights will not be enforced.
B. Indemnification
Courts also have decided the legal effect of indemnification clauses in-
cluded in waiver forms. These clauses require that the participant pay any
damages awarded against the provider, and in addition may also require
that the participant shoulder the cost of the provider's legal defense. If they
are enforceable, the child's only remedy effectively could be against his or
her parent(s). 119
The same analysis which bars waivers of childrens' rights to sue for
negligence should also free children from any obligations to indemnify.
Recognizing this, courts invalidating waivers also have struck down indem-
nification clauses as to children:
Indemnification agreements executed by a parent or guardian in
favor of [parties] ... committing torts against an infant or incompe-
tent, are invalid as they place the interests of the child or incompe-
tent against those of the parent or guardian. 'Clearly, a parent who
116. See supra note 88.
117. Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 21 Conn. Supp. 38, 40, 143
A.2d 466, 448 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958).
118. Doyle v. Bowdoin College, 403 A.2d 1206, 1208 n.3 (Maine Sup. Ct. 1979).
119. Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). Would a parent
with substantial assets fie the child's lawsuit, knowing that the parent ultimately may be forced to
pay the judgement?
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has placed himself in the position of indemnitor will be a dubious
champion of his infant child's rights.' 20
Courts have stated that this result is compelled by the common law, in
particular the long standing policy allowing minors to disaffirm con-
tracts. 12 ' The Childress court noted that if social policy favors a different
conclusion, legislatures and not courts should balance the interests:
It is not our intention, nor do we feel the result of this case will
be, to put a chill on activities such as the Special Olympics. The law
is clear that a guardian cannot on behalf of an infant or incompetent,
exculpate or indemnify against liability those organizations which
sponsor activities for children and the mentally disabled. If this rule
of law is other than as it should be, we feel the remedy is with the
[State] Supreme Court or the legislature. 122
As suggested above, it is not clear whether an indemnification clause
will be struck down as to a parent who signs. If not, a provider's liability
either to a child or to a non-signing parent might have to be paid by the
parent who signed: "However, Mrs. Childress did clearly agree to indem-
nify the Special Olympics 'from all liabilities . . .' Therefore, to the extent
the defendants are liable to Mr. Childress, Mrs. Childress, as indemnitor,
must compensate him."' 23
The result depends on whether the court adopts the Wagenblast ap-
proach or the Childress approach. The former, which bars exculpation as a
matter of public policy, may apply to all parties involved and thus free not
only children but also parents from waivers they have signed. The latter,
which is based on a minor's common law right to disaffirm contracts, may
only free the minor and not to a parent who signs a waiver.
V. EFFECT OF A CHILD'S SIGNATURE
Providers of sports-related activities to children often require that both
parents and children sign a waiver.124 However, the child's signature
120. Id. at 7 (citations omitted).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 7-8.
123. Id. at 6. It is unlikely that a parent would be insured against such an obligation because
the agreement to indemnify was voluntary. Even where the liability is covered by parents' own
insurance, the policy's limits could be inadequate where a child has been severely injured.
Furthermore, unless the couple is divorced, the father's suit might be valid but recovery illu-
sory. If the couple is living together, payment would occur, if at all, to the extent the signor has
the economic ability to pay the non-signing parent. The paying spouse might be required to draw
on separate rather than joint funds. Sources of funds becomes even more interesting in commu-
nity property states.
124. See supra notes 2-3.
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should have no legal effect because minors can only enter into a voidable
contract. 125 These contracts are subject to disaffrmance prior to and for a
reasonable time after reaching majority. 126
One court described the reason for the rule:
All lawyers know that the protection of infants is one of the chief
concerns of the law. The rule is that no one may deal with a minor,
except for necessaries .... This positive inhibition is the way of the
law to protect infants against their own lack of discretion and
against the snares of designing persons. 127
Although the Childress approach suggests that minors' common law
rights to disaffirm contracts render waivers unenforceable against children,
that is not the actual holding in Childress because there the minor did not
sign the release.1 21 In cases where the minor did sign the waiver, however,
other courts have held that the signature did not bind the minor due to
disaffirmance rights.1 29 Disaffirmance has been allowed even where a minor
misrepresented his age to be that of an adult's. 13°
This brings up an interesting issue. Can a minor sue a provider for
breach of contract while at the same time trying to disaffirm only a part of
the contract, the waiver? In Holland v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 131
the court held that when disaffirming an insurance contract, the minor
plaintiff can not affirm the insurance policy yet disaffirm the uninsured mo-
torist portion. Following this logic, in order to be effective a disaffirmance
must be complete.132
Based on case law, minors should be able to disaffirm contracts which
contain waivers.' 33 The effect is that minors, or persons acting on behalf of
the minor, have an option, at any time during minority and for a reasonable
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1981).
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (1981).
127. O'Leary Estate, 352 Pa. 254, 259, 42 A.2d 624, 625 (1945).
128. Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
129. E.g., Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Center, 670 F. Supp. 140 (E.D. Pa.
1987) (both the minor and her mother signed the waiver); Celli v. Sports Car Club of America,
Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 511, 517-18, 105 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1973).
130. Del Santo v. Bristol County Stadium, Inc., 273 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
131. 270 Cal. 2d 417, 75 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1969).
132. The minor plaintiff thus pays the price of giving up a breach of contract lawsuit by
disaffirming the contract. The only remaining cause of action will be in tort. That may be harder
to prove than breach of contract because in tort the plaintiff must show that the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury. In addition, the defendant may have one of several tort defenses.
These could include contributory negligence, comparative negligence, express assumption of the
risk, or implied assumption of the risk. Although tort law implications in this area are interesting,
as noted above they are beyond the scope of this article. See supra notes 9 and 94.
133. Some states have enacted limited exceptions to common law disaffirmance rights. See,
eg., TEX. FAM. LAW § 12.09 (1989); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 25.5-25.7, 25.9, 34.3-34.10 (1991) (mi-
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time thereafter, to decide whether to be bound by the contract. Thus, mi-
nors who sign a waiver nevertheless are able to sue a service provider.
This does not mean that a child's signature on a waiver will have no
effect as a matter of fact. Some potential plaintiffs may not fie a lawsuit if
they signed a waiver, either because they do not know it is unenforceable or
because they feel morally bound by their signature."' A minor's signature
also may be useful to the provider during settlement negotiations or in
proving a tort defense such as that the minor knowingly and expressly
waived the risk of injury or that the minor was contributorily negligent.1 35
VI. CONCLUSION
This article examined the current state of contract law dealing with
waivers for minors participating in sports-related activities. Although
waivers are an effective method of shifting the risk of damage awards away
from a sponsoring organization to an adult participant, the scant authority
dealing directly with the issue suggests that neither waivers nor indemnifi-
cation clauses will be enforceable against minors. However, they may be
enforceable against parents who sign releases. That is, in some jurisdictions
a parent who signs a waiver may lose the right to sue a provider for harm
suffered by the parent, but a parent's agreement to waive the child's rights
will not be enforced.
Because courts consistently have refused to enforce waivers against chil-
dren, in the absence of legislation to the contrary, sports providers most
likely will continue to bear the costs of injuries regardless of whether a par-
ent or a minor signs a waiver. Both providers and parents should be aware,
I
nors can be bound to certain health-related contracts), and CAL. Civ. CODE § 36 (1991) (certain
employment agreements for artists or athletes).
In contrast to contractual liability, minors are held responsible for their torts unless they are
too young to understand the consequences of their acts. Moreover, although too young to be
bound to a contract which may include a waiver, minors have the ability to waive their constitu-
tional rights under the Fifth Amendment if the waiver is knowing and intelligent. People v. Lara,
67 Cal. 2d 365, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967). Thus, even though a minor is incompetent to enter into
a contract to purchase a car, (s)he is allowed to waive procedural rights which may result in a
lifetime in jail.
134. See supra § IV.
135. Thus, the service provider may not be financially responsible if a minor is injured. The
plaintiff must still prove that the service provider was negligent, and overcome tort defenses avail-
able to the service provider. The defense of express assumption of the risk may be a complete bar
to the minor's recovery because the waiver form that the minor signed may be proof that the
minor was aware of the risks, and undertook to assume the risks, associated with the activity.
However, some courts have held that if contractual waivers are against public policy, the use of
these waivers to construct a tort defense also would violate public policy. See supra note 94. As
noted above, a discussion of tort implications is beyond the scope of this article. See supra note 9.
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however, that there is no case law in most jurisdictions. Organizations
seeking protection from the hazards of an increasingly litigious society
should look to means other than exculpation clauses to ensure limited liabil-
ity. This may result in service providers investing more in safety, but also
may result in fewer activities being sponsored for children.

